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THE LEGALISATION OF 
EUROPEAN UNION FOREIGN 
POLICY AND THE USE OF 
SANCTIONS 
Paul James Cardwell 
School of  Law, University of  Sheffield* 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article explores the legalisation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
of the European Union (EU) and its increasing use of sanctions. It argues that the 
breadth and depth of the numerous sanctions regimes in place shows that European 
foreign policy is not merely an aspiration but produces law and legal processes which 
VKDUHVLPLODULWLHVZLWKWKRVHLQWKHUHVWRIWKH(8·VOHJDORUGHU. Further, the article 
examines the extent to which non-EU Member States in Europe have aligned themselves 
with EU sanctions. The argument is made that this is evidence not only of 
Europeanisation, but also crucially of a legalised foreign policy which has allowed Europe-
wide, EU-led foreign policy to emerge.  
KEYWORDS 
European Union (EU), Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Sanctions, 
Restrictive Measures, European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), EU External Relations 
                                                 
* 7KLVDUWLFOHZDVGUDIWHGGXULQJDSHULRGDVDYLVLWLQJ3URIHVVRUDWWKH&HQWUHG·pWXGHV
européennes, Sciences Po, Paris in May 2015. I would also like to thank Kenneth 
Armstrong, Eva Nanopoulos and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
&DQWKHIRUHLJQSROLF\RIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ(8EHXQGHUVWRRGDV¶OHJDO·")RUHLJQ
SROLF\KDVORQJEHHQVHHQDVWKH¶RWKHU·WRPDinstream European integration: devoid of 
UHDO¶ODZ·EDVHGRQFRRUGLQDWLRQ² not integration ² and a place where legal scholars have 
little to contribute to debates over what the European Union is, or should be doing, and 
how to do it. Although the EU has enjoyed competences in the external sphere since the 
original Treaty of Rome, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as 
UHSUHVHQWLQJWKHFRUHRI(8¶IRUHLJQSROLF\·1 has been generally understood as a place for 
political bargaining between the Member States with limited room for technical, legal 
UHDVRQLQJ7KLVLVODUJHO\GXHWRWKH¶RWKHUQHVV·RIWKH&)63IRXQGLQWKH(8·VOHJDO
RUGHUDVDVHSDUDWH¶SLOODU·XSRQLWVFUHDWLRQLQWKH7UHDW\RI0DDVWULFKWDQGVSHFLDOVWDWXV
in the Treaty of Lisbon.  
 TKLVDUWLFOHDVVHUWVWKDWWKHIRUHLJQSROLF\RIWKH&)63KDVLQIDFWEHHQ¶OHJDOLVHG·
%\WKLV,PHDQWKDWWKH&)63PD\QRWSURGXFHWKHVDPH¶ODZ·ZLWKWKHVDPH
characteristics as other areas of EU law, such as formal enforceability. But this does not 
prevent us from seeing processes and outcomes in the CFSP which are underpinned by 
legal authority and which follow legal reasoning and logics. I argue that legalisation has 
WDNHQSODFHLQVSLWHRIWKHDWWHPSWVLQWKH7UHDW\WR¶ULQJ-IHQFH·IRUHLJQSROLF\DZD\from 
¶PDLQVWUHDP·DUHDVRILQWHJUDWLRQ 
The article makes the claim that the use of sanctions2 are the key to 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJWKHOHJDOLVDWLRQRIWKH(8·VIRUHLJQSROLF\ In recent years the EU has 
                                                 
1 7KLVDUWLFOHXVHVWKH&)63WRGHQRWHWKH(8·VIRUHLJQSROLF\7KLVLVGLVWLQFWIURP
¶H[WHUQDOUHODWLRQV·ZKLFKUHODWHVWRDPXFKZLGHUVHWRIFRPSHWHQFHVDQGSUDFWLFHVDW(8
level. 
2 Reference is made throughout this article tR¶VDQFWLRQV·DVDVKRUWKDQGIRU¶UHVWULFWLYH
PHDVXUHV·ZKLFKLVWKHWHUPXVHGLQWKH7UHDW\,QWHUQDWLRQDOODZ\HUVXVHWKHWHUP
¶FRXQWHUPHDVXUHV·WRUHIHUWRQRQ-forcible measures, which may include the type of 
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demonstrated both a strong willingness and ability to impose sanctions on third states, 
and natural and legal persons. These have been both as a result of United Nations 
6HFXULW\&RXQFLO816&UHVROXWLRQVDQGWKH(8·VRZQDXWRQRPRXVLQLWLDWLYHV7KHUH
are now over 30 active sanctions regimes in place. Sanctions are both a foreign policy 
tool and a legal instrument, capable in some circumstances of bring challenged in the 
courts and following a (albeit unique) legislative process. Sanctions often connect foreign 
SROLF\DFWRUQHVVZLWKWKH(8·VFRQVLGHUDEOHHFRQRPLFweight and in many cases have 
EHFRPHWKH¶JRWR·UHPHG\DWWKH(XURSHDQOHYHO7KHH[WHQWWRZKLFKVDQFWLRQVKDYH
been imposed, or at the very least discussed in the Council, mean that it is little 
exaggeration to say that the CFSP has become oriented towards sanctions as an 
appropriate response to global or regional problems. 
,DUJXHWKDWWKH(8·VXVHRIVDQFWLRQVKDVFRQWULEXWHGWRDWZR-way process by 
which the use of sanctions has facilitated the legalisation process to the extent that the 
post-Lisbon CFSP is centred on the use of sanctions as representing a particularly 
legalised form of instrument. The legal and procedural formalism associated with 
sanction regimes brings these phenomena within the scope and development of foreign 
policy in spite of assertions by some Member States that the CFSP is outside the scope 
RI¶ODZ·$WWKHVDPHWLPHWKHOHJDOLVDWLRQRI&)63KDVLQWXUQDOORZHGVDQFWLRQVUHJLPHV
to be developed in a more sophisticated way in the Council which explains their 
diversity, both geographical and substantive. 
In the second part of the article, I explore two consequences of the legalisation of the 
(8·VIRUHLJQSROLF\ZKLFKKDYHHPHUJHGYLDWKHXVHRIVDQFWLRQV7KHILUVWLVWKDWWKH
                                                                                                                                           
measures employed by the EU but often refers to suspension of treaty obligations, which 
is beyond the scope of analysis here. See further J Crawford, The International Law 
&RPPLVVLRQ·V$UWLFOHVRQ6WDWH5HVSRQVLELOLW\ (Cambridge University Press, 2002) and F 
'RSDJQH¶6DQFWLRQVDQG&RXQWHUPHDVXUHVE\ International Organizations: Diverging 
/HVVRQVIRUWKH,GHDRI$XWRQRP\·LQ5&ROOLQVDQG1'White International Organisations 
and the Idea of Autonomy (Routledge, 2011) 
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extent to which the EU has developed its use of sanctions as a core foreign policy tool 
and the range of third states and situations to which they apply are a success in terms of 
meeting some of the Treaty-based foreign policy goals. Second, the extent to which non-
Member States of the EU in Europe have adopted the same sanctions ² and publicly 
aligned themselves with the EU ² demonstrates that the EU has made great strides in 
forging a European foreign policy, and one based on Law. This speaks to the argument 
that EU foreign policy is not merely words, but ¶DFWLRQV·WRR)XUWKHULWIXOILOVD7UHDW\-
based goal for the EU to promote its values, particularly with neighbouring countries. 
1. THE PROGRESSIVE ¶/(*$/,6$7,21·2)(8
FOREIGN POLICY 
Legalisation refers to two interconnected phenomena. First, it refers to a process by 
which gradual cooperation between actors over time develops into an institutionalised 
arena, which abides by a set of rules which the members regard as being bound by 
(whether or not there is any enforcement mechanism).3 In this respect, legalisation thus 
represents a general transformation from the informal to the formal. Second, legalisation 
can refer to a set of characteristics defined according to conditions of obligation, 
precision and delegation.4 That is to say, institutions can be more or less legalised, 
depending on the extent to which they abide by sets of rules or commitments 
(obligation), whether these are unambiguous (precision) and if authority has been granted 
to make decisions and enforce them (delegation).5 The social context and social practices 
                                                 
3 In the EU context, this has been used in particular by ME Smith, (XURSH·V)RUHLJQDnd 
Security Policy: the Institutionalization of Cooperation (Cambridge University Press, 2004).  
4 .:$EERWW¶7KH&RQFHSWRI/HJDOLVDWLRQ·International Organization 401 
5 ,ELG6HHDOVR$6DUL¶%HWZHHQ/HJDOLVDWLRQDQG2UJDQLVDWLRQDO'HYHORSPent: 
([SODLQLQJWKH(YROXWLRQRI(8&RPSHWHQFHLQWKH)LHOGRI)RUHLJQ3ROLF\·LQ3-
Cardwell (ed) EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era (Asser 
Press/Springer, 2012) 
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of law are brought to the fore in this vision of legalisation.6 Legalisation in this respect 
could be seen as akin to institutionalisation, and indeed I have argued elsewhere that the 
CFSP represents an institutionalised form of cooperation.7 But legalisation is used here 
specifically because of the distinction it makes in identifying the transition from the 
informal to the formal. Since sanctions are formal instruments ZKLFKSURGXFH¶KDUG·OHJDO
HIIHFWVLWLVSRVVLEOHWRFKDUDFWHULVHWKHZKROHRIWKH&)63DVEHLQJ¶OHJDOLVHG·GXHWRWKH
central role in which the process of imposing sanctions plays, particularly in the post-
Lisbon era. Similarly, there are parallels with the literature on Europeanisation, though 
this often relates more closely to the domestic changes in the Member States who are 
engaged in the integration process than the EU institutional level changes.8 
Foreign policy occupies and unusual place within the legal and institutional system of 
the EU. 7KH(8·V¶QHZOHJDORUGHU·9 was established very early in the integration process, 
but even as the legal system of the EU matured, the drafters of the Treaty of Maastricht 
deliberately kept foreign policy away from the mainstream legal order. Testing the extent 
to which European foreign policy has been legalised requires an analysis of the extent to 
which actors (Member States) are capable of agreeing measures, on what subject matters, 
how regularly and whether tKH\EHOLHYHWKHPVHOYHVWREHFUHDWLQJ¶ODZ·$OWKRXJKWKH
legalisDWLRQFRXOGEHDFKLHYHGPHUHO\E\WKH¶LQWHUQDO·UXOHVRIEHKDYLRXUHVWDEOLVKHGE\
the members, the legalisation can also be measured by the extent of which its external 
                                                 
6 Though see also Finnemore and Toope, who argue that this view of legalisation is 
¶XQQHFHVVDULO\QDUURZ·DQGLQVWHDGXVHDPXFKZLGHUFRQFHSWRIODZZKLFKLVQRWIXOO\
dependent on the effect of legal texts and delegation: M Finnemore and S Toope 
¶$OWHUQDWLYHVWR/HJDOLVDWLRQ5LFKHU9LHZVRI/DZDQG3ROLWLFV·3) International 
Organization 743 
7 PJ Cardwell, EU External Relations and Systems of Governance (Routledge, 2009) pp 72-74 
8 See, for example, the contributions to M Green Cowels, JA Caporaso and T Risse (eds) 
Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change (Cornell University Press, 2001) 
and K Fetherstone and C Radaelli (eds) The Politics of Europeanization (Oxford University 
Press, 2003) 
9 van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, C-26/62, EU:C:1963:1 
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projection through foreign policy results in changes to law and legal systems outside the 
EU too.10  
The original EC Treaty did not foresee any substantial foreign policy role for the 
nascent EU and hence there was no application of the Community method of law-
making to foreign policy, or any means of discussing pertinent issues between the 
Member States. There were provisions in the Treaty which concerned economic 
dimensions relating to the worlGEH\RQG(XURSH·VERUGHUVLQSDUWLFXODUthe Common 
Commercial Policy and tariffs towards countries which had been, or which were still, 
European colonial possessions.11 But these were more a necessary counterpart to the 
internal integration process than an attempt to forge a common external policy. Whilst 
the option of forging a foreign and security policy was present at the outset of the 
European integration process, the formation of a European Defence Community in the 
mid 1950s failed,12 which put a stop to any moves to include foreign and defence 
cooperation within the ambit of the European integration process.  
The early 1970s witnessed two innovations which changed the QDWXUHRIWKH(8·V
engagement with the wider world. First, in 1970 the Council of Ministers adopted the 
Davignon Report,13 which laid the foundations for what became European Political 
Cooperation (EPC). EPC was D¶SXUHO\·LQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDOIRUXPIRUWKH0ember States 
WRGLVFXVVLQWHUQDWLRQDOLVVXHVRIFRQFHUQLQD¶SUDJPDWLFDQGIOH[LEOH·ZD\14 and aimed to 
                                                 
10 This is explored further in part 4 
11 Article 217 TFEU 
12 $0HQRQ$)RUVWHUDQG::DOODFH¶$&RPPRQ(XURSHDQ'HIHQFH"·
Survival 98 
13 Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the problems of political 
unification (Davignon Report), Bulletin of the European Communities, no 11. (Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, 1970) pp 9-14  
14 *)LW]JHUDOG¶(XURSHDQ3ROLWLFDO&RRSHUDWLRQ·LQ$+5REHUWVRQHGEuropean 
Yearbook/Annuaire Européen (Martinus Nijhoff, 1976). For a fuller history of EPC, see S 
Nutall European Political Cooperation (Oxford University Press, 1992) 
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promote and ensure VROLGDULW\DQGD¶KDUPRQL]DWLRQRIYLHZV·15 EPC provided a platform 
for discussion of foreign policy between the Member States but was initially ascribed no 
decision- or law-making competences, until the Single European Act 1987 made some 
attempts to formalise the practices the Member States had developed. 
Second, the Court of Justice laid down in the AETR/ERTA judgment of 197116 
the principle of implied external powers which belonged to the Community on the basis 
of its own internal competences found in the Treaty. This was a major step in 
recognising the ability of the institutions to act with the external dimension of policies in 
mind, but was not without controversy. The Court stated that ¶HDFKWLPHWKH
Community, with a view to implementing a common policy envisaged by the Treaty, 
adopts provisions laying down common rules, whatever form these may take, the 
Member States no long have the right, acting individually or even collectively, to 
XQGHUWDNHREOLJDWLRQVZLWKWKLUGFRXQWULHVZKLFKDIIHFWWKRVHUXOHV·17 The controversy 
arose from this wide-ranging provision due to the Court·VODFNRI explanation of the 
exact circumstances where implied competences might arise.18 The imposition of 
sanctions is not based on this jurisprudence per se, but it does provide the context for the 
discussion here. This is because there was little doubt left that the Court was willing to 
SODFHWKH(8·VLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQVmore broadly within the ambit of its legal order. 
The intergovernmental nature of EU foreign policy remained its hallmark in the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) agreed at Maastricht in 19927KH¶SLOODU·VWUXFWXUH 
created by the Treaty ensured that the CFSP ² DVWKH¶VHFRQG·SLOODU² was not subject to 
the law-making powers of the first pillar Community method and thus RXWVLGHWKH¶QHZ
                                                 
15 Davignon Report, see note 13 above 
16 Commission v Council of the European Communities, C-22/70, EU:C:1971:32 
17 Ibid para 17 
18 P Koutrakos EU International Relations Law, 2nd ed (Hart Publishing, 2015) p 82 
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OHJDORUGHU·LGHQWLILHGLQVan Gend en Loos.19 Instead the policy was given specific 
instruments of which the legal enforceability was questionable,20 and deliberately distinct 
from the Regulations, Directives and Decisions of (now) Article 288 TFEU. The CFSP 
ZDVVKRZQWREHPRUHUHVLVWDQWWKDQWKH¶WKLUG·SLOODURIJustice and Home Affairs, which 
was gradually Communautarised in the Treaties of Amsterdam and Lisbon, despite the 
strong criticisms levelled at the CFSP for its perceived lack of effectiveness and merely 
¶GHFODUDWRU\·QDWXUHGXULQJWKHVDQGV. The Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice 
did introduce some incremental changes, including the role of the High Representative 
for Foreign and Security Policy,21 rationalising the decision-making procedures22 and 
launching a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).23 However, the 
characterisation of a weak EU foreign policy has been difficult to throw off. 
Following the Treaty of Lisbon, which attempted to promote greater coherence 
betweeQWKH(8·VFRPSHWHQFHV in the external sphereWKH¶SLOODU·VWUXFWXUHZDVODUJHO\
abandoned, and the Union ² rather than just the Community ² gained legal personality in 
its own right.24 Whilst the single legal personality ended the confusing separateness at the 
heart of the EU institutional arrangements, the CFSP itself remains distinct from the 
general legal order of the Union, in a manner which I have characterised elsewhere as 
being ¶ULQJ-IHQFHG·25 In order to reinforce the ¶otherness· RIWKH&)63ZLWKLQWKH(8·V
                                                 
19 G De Baere Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations (Oxford University Press, 
2008) p 204 
20 E Denza The Intergovernmental Pillars of the European Union (Oxford University Press, 
2002) pp 132-133. See also the discussion on pre-Lisbon CFSP instruments in A 
'DVKZRRG¶7KH/DZDQG3UDFWLFHRI&)63-RLQW$FWLRQV·LQ0&UHPRQDDQG%'H:LWWH
(eds) EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals (Hart Publishing, 2008) 
21 Now Article 27 TEU 
22 Now Article 31 TEU 
23 P Koutrakos, The EU Common Security and Defence Policy (Oxford University Press, 2013); 
J Howarth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 2nd ed (Palgrave MacMillan, 
2014) 
24 Article 47 TEU 
25 3-&DUGZHOO¶2Q¶ULQJ-IHQFLQJ·WKH&RPPRQ)RUHLJQDQG6HFXULW\3ROLF\LQWKHOHJDO
RUGHURIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ·Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 443 
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legal order, at Lisbon the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) over the provisions of the CFSP was made explicit, both in the 
section devoted to the CFSP26 and the provisions dealing with powers of the CJEU, in 
Article 275 TFEU.27 The pre-Lisbon version of the TEU had made no mention of the 
powers of the Court in the CFSP articles or possibility for judicial review of CFSP 
measures.28 But the settlement at Lisbon appeared to pre-empt any attempt by the Court 
to replicate what it had done in Pupino29 for the former third pillar, whereby the legal 
principle of indirect effect was ¶UHDGDFURVV·DQGKHOGWRDSSO\LQthe domain of justice 
and home affairs too. This is in spite of the general principle of loyalty for the Member 
States now laid down in Article 24 TFEU30 DQGZKLFKDSSOLHVDFURVVWKH(8·VDFWLYLWLHV 
Sealing the CFSP away from a Court which has long-since been seen as integrationist 
appears to have been the aim of the drafters of the Treaty of Lisbon. Through its 
extensive case-law on sanctions and in particular the decision in Parliament v Council 
(2012),31 the Court of Justice has safeguarded the separateness endowed on the CFSP 
                                                 
26 $UWLFOH7(8¶The Court of Justice of the European Union shall not have 
jurisdiction with respect to these provisions, with the exception of its jurisdiction to 
monitor compliance with Article 40 of this Treaty and to review the legality of certain 
decisions as provided for by the second parDJUDSKRI$UWLFOH7)(8· 
27 ´7KH&RXUWRI-XVWLFHRIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQVKDOOQRWKDYHMXULVGLFWLRQZLWKUHVSHFW
to the provisions relating to the common foreign and security policy nor with respect to 
DFWVDGRSWHGRQWKHEDVLVRIWKRVHSURYLVLRQVµ 
28 A Hinarejos Judicial Control in the European Union: Reforming Jurisdiction in the 
Intergovernmental Pillars (Oxford University Press, 2009) 
29 Criminal Proceedings against Maria Pupino, C-105/03, EU:C:2005:386. The principle was 
read across from Mangold v Helm, Case C-144/04, EU:C:2005:709 and Kücükdeveci v Swedex 
GmbH, Case C-555/07, EU:C:2010:21. For further comment, see V Mitselegas, EU 
Criminal Law +DUW3XEOLVKLQJSDQG0)OHWFKHU¶([WHQGLQJ´,QGLUHFW(IIHFWµ
to the Third Pillar: the Significance of Pupino·European Law Review 862 
30 ¶The member states shall support the common foreign and security policy actively and 
XQUHVHUYHGO\LQDVSLULWRIOR\DOW\DQGPXWXDOVROLGDULW\DQGVKDOOFRPSO\ZLWKWKH8QLRQ·V
DFWLRQLQWKLVDUHD· 
31 European Parliament v Council of the European Union (individual restrictive measures case) C-
130/10, EU:C:2012:472 
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ZLWKLQWKH7UHDW\DQGDFWHGXSRQLWVUROHRISROLFLQJWKHERXQGDULHVRIWKH(8·VYDULRXV
FRPSHWHQFHV7KLVLQWXUQSODFHVWKH&)63IXOO\ZLWKLQWKH(8·VFRQVWLWXWLRQDORUGHU32 
However, despite the Treaty-level ¶ring-fencing· of the CFSP, the practice of 
European foreign policy is not immune from increasing legalisation. The objectives and 
principles governing the conduct of external relations, including the CFSP, were brought 
within the same section of the Treaty.33 7KHDLPZDVWRSURPRWHFRKHUHQFHLQWKH(8·V
external relations across its spheres of activity, even if different objectives may apply to 
different dimensions.34 The institutional framework, whilst prioritising the role of the 
Council as the main (intergovernmental) actor, nevertheless permits the Commission to 
take a leading role and thus part of an LQVWLWXWLRQDO¶IXQFWLRQDOZKROH·.35 The High 
Representative for Foreign and Security Policy is also a Vice-President of the 
Commission,36 which not only leaves a large amount of scope for the individual post-
holder to shape the role but also leaves open the question of how a single person is 
PHDQWWRGLYLGHWKHLULQVWLWXWLRQDO¶OR\DOWLHV·ZLWKLQWKHVDPHIXQFWLRQ Van Vooren has 
suggested that the CFSP has evolved into having a personality in its own right, separate 
from the (former) first pillar and the Member States collectively, and this is embodied in 
the post of the High Representative.37 Similar institutional questions have been raised 
UHJDUGLQJWKH(8·VGLSORPDWLFVHUYLFHWKH(XURSHDQ([WHUQDO$FWLRQ6HUYLFH(($638 
                                                 
32 &+LOOLRQ¶$3RZHUOHVV&RXUW"7KH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI-XVWLFHDQGWKH&RPPRQ
)RUHLJQDQG6HFXULW\3ROLF\·LQ0&UHPRQDDQG$7KLHVHGVThe European Court of Justice 
and External Relations Law (Hart Publishing, 2014) p 65 
33 Articles 21-22 TEU 
34 See, in particular, Article 21 (3) TEU 
35 3.RXWUDNRV¶7KH(8·V&RPPRQ)RUHLJQDQG6HFXULW\3ROLF\·LQ'$VKLDJERU1
countouris and I Lianos (eds) The European Union After the Treaty of Lisbon 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012) p 188 
36 Article 18 (3) and (4) TEU 
37 B Van Vooren EU External Relations Law and the European Neighbourhood Policy; A 
Paradigm for Coherence (Routledge, 2012) pp 39-40 
38 C Carta The European Union Diplomatic Service (Routledge, 2012); L Erkelens and S 
%ORFNPDQV¶Setting up the European External Action Service: an  
DFWRI,QVWLWXWLRQDO%DODQFH· European Constitutional Law Review 246 and  
 11 
Taken together, fusing institutional roles as well as competences in a bid to ensure 
FRKHUHQFHPDNHVDQ\DWWHPSWWRVHSDUDWHWKH¶OHJDO·IURPWKH¶QRQ-OHJDO·ODUJHly futile. 
FurtherDV+LOOLRQKDVDUJXHGWKH&RXUW·VMXULVGLFWLRQLQUHODWLRQWRWKH&)63LV
not as limited as an initial reading of the post-Lisbon Treaty arrangements might 
suggest.39 He asserts that although there are limits to what the CJEU is able to do in 
terms of the substantive contents of the CFSP, the Court has gained jurisdiction over 
constitutional principles including respect for fundamental rights, the principle of sincere 
cooperation and the requirement of consistency.40 Therefore, the exclusion of the Court 
in practice is not as complete or watertight as the text of the Treaty implies. 
Nevertheless, against a backdrop of institutional developments which makes the 
CFSP more legalised than it is often thought to be, the instruments available to the 
institutions under the CFSP41 do not enjoy the formal enforceability provided by 
legislative acts. $UWLFOH7(8H[SOLFLWO\VWDWHVWKDW¶The adoption of legislative acts 
shall be excluded·ZLWKLQ the CFSP,42 distinguishing them from the ¶OHJDODFWVRIWKH
8QLRQ·GHILQHGLQ$UWLFOH7)(8.  
As such, it is difficult to argue that the obligation dimension of legalisation43 has been 
adequately met, that is to say, by the agreement of binding (in a formal sense) rules. 
However, examining the evolution of the CFSP since the Treaty of Lisbon in particular 
reveals that sanctions are increasingly prominent its field and scope of activity which, it is 
worth recalling, covers ¶DOODVSHFWV·of foreign policy.44 The argument here is that the 
                                                                                                                                           
G De Baere and R :HVVHOV¶EU Law and the EEAS: Of Complex Competences and 
&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&RQVHTXHQFHV·LQJ%D ғtora and D Spence (eds), 7KH(8·V'LSORPDWLF6\VWHP
post- Westphalia and the European External Action Service, (Palgrave MacMillan, 2014). 
39 Hillion, see note 32 above 
40 Ibid, p 66 
41 As listed in Article 25 TEU 
42 Also repeated in Article 31 TEU 
43 Abbott, see note 4 above 
44 $UWLFOH7(8´The Union's competence in matters of common foreign and 
security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the 
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post-Lisbon CFSP represents a step further of legalisation given the importance of 
sanctions as a lynchpin of the contemporary CFSP. To be clear: it is not that the 
instruments under the CFSP can be seen in exactly the same way as the legal acts 
mentioned in Article 288 TFEU, but rather that the practice of negotiating the CFSP 
measures which will be mirrored in enforceable legislation has exerted a strong influence 
on the legalisation process. To support this point, it is first necessary to explore how the 
current sanctions regime as an integral part of the CFSP came about. 
2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EU SANCTIONS 
REGIMES 
Sanctions are measures which aim to restrict the economic and other relationships 
between states, or between states and the international community (including regional 
organisations). Sanctions are used as a means to promote a change in behaviour, as a 
punishment or a means to isolate a state, or a combination thereof. The same rationale 
applies to more recent moves to impose sanctions on natural and legal persons who are 
suspected of involvement in international criminal acts, such as terrorism. Though 
beyond the limits of the discussion in this article, there is much debate about whether ² 
in general terms or when applied to a specific country or individual ² they are an 
effective tool in terms of punishment, promoting change or preventing the spread of 
terrorism.45 In the EU context, sanctions are one of the best examples of the blurred 
lines between (external) trade policy and foreign policy, and their respective competences 
                                                                                                                                           
Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that 
might lead to a common defence.µ 
45 )RUDQRYHUYLHZVHH$9LQHV¶The effectiveness of UN and EU sanctions: lessons for 
the twenty-first century·International Affairs 867 and D Hawkins and J Lloyd 
¶4XHVWLRQLQJ&RPSUHKHQVLYH6DQFWLRQVWKH%LUWKRI$1RUP·Journal of 
Human Rights 443 
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and institutional responsibilities in the Treaty arrangements.46 It is argued here that it is 
impossible to separate the ¶legal· consequences and considerations of imposing sanctions 
from WKH¶SROLWLFDO·LQERWKDIRUPDODQGDFRQFHSWXDOVHQVHDVWKH\DUHLQWULQVLFDOO\OLQNHG 
The use of sanctions by the UNSC first emerged during the 1960s. Once a 
UNSC Resolution has been adopted, international law requires states to enact national 
measures to enable the legal effectiveness of sanctions.47 Initially, adopting UNSC 
sanctions was achieved by the Member States individually and without the involvement 
of the EU institutions,48 since the latter are not bound by obligations under the UN 
Charter and there was nothing in the Treaty arrangements at the time to suggest any 
transfer of competence. This individual approach was problematic in terms of the lack of 
coherence between the Member States in their national measures, leading to distortions 
(potential or actual) within the common market. In turn, the distortions impacted on the 
externally-facing Common Commercial Policy which already enjoyed extensive EU 
competence.49 There has also been a debate on whether a transfer of obligations has 
occurred between the Member States and the EU according to the theory of state 
succession, which the General Court (formerly the Court of First Instance) eventually 
attempted to lay down in Kadi and Yusuf50 on the basis of the (8·VH[SHULHQFHZLWK
GATT obligations.51 
                                                 
46 P Eeckhout EU External Relations Law, 2nd ed (Oxford University Press, 2011) pp 501-
502 
47 United Nations Charter, Articles 41 and 103 
48 P Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, 2nd ed (Hart Publishing, 2015) pp. 495-496. 
Rhodesia was the target state of the first set of sanctions concluded in this manner. 
49 Now Article 207 TFEU 
50 Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, T-
306/01, EU:T:2005:331 and Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council and Commission, T-315/06, 
EU:T:2005:332 
51 International Fruit Company and Others v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit, C-21/72 to 
24/72, EU:C:1972:115. J .ODEEHUV¶Völkerrechtsfreundlich? International Law and the 
8QLRQ/HJDO2UGHU·LQ3.RXWUDNRVHGEuropean Foreign Policy: Legal and Political 
Perspectives (Edward Elgar, 2011) pp 106-107 
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The number of UNSC resolutions on imposing mandatory sanctions was limited 
until the end of the Cold War, with only Rhodesia (1966-1979) and South Africa (1977-
1994)52 as the objects. Only after the end of the Cold War and the lack of major 
ideological differences in the UNSC has WKH¶WUHQG·, as Cassese has termed it, for the 
international community to react to gross breaches of international law by means of 
sanctions emerged.53 UNSC sanctions on Libya, Sudan and Afghanistan during the 
1990s54 were spearheaded by the United States and began ² even before 9/11 ² to target 
states which supported terrorist groups.55 For its part, autonomous EU sanctions were 
applied to both the USSR and Argentina in the early 1980s.56 
The end of the Cold War coincided with the eventual moves towards the 
conclusion of the Treaty of Maastricht which, in attempting to endow the Union with an 
international political voice consummate with its economic might, allowed the EU to 
engage in a more proactive approach with regard to the projection of its values via the 
imposition of sanctions.57 
 This was an important turning point, but one which required a legal response to 
the question of how to connect the non-legally enforceable CFSP with the mainstream 
legal order. The response was found in the practices which initially emerged during the 
1980s, by adopting a decision in the framework of EPC, followed by a Regulation 
                                                 
52 1:KLWHDQG$$EDVV¶&RXQWHUPHDVXUHVDQG6DQFWLRQV·LQ1(YDQVHGInternational 
Law, 2nd ed (Oxford University Press, 2006) p 527 
53 A Cassese, International Law, 2nd ed (Oxford University Press, 2005) pp. 310-311 
54 D Cortwritght and GA Lopez, The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s 
(Lynne Rienner Publishing, 2000) 
55 (&/XFN¶7DFNOLQJ7HUURULVP·LQ'00DORQHThe UN Security Council: From the Cold 
War to the 21st Century (Lynne Rienner Publishing, 2004) p 94-95 
56 Council Regulation (EEC) No 596/82 of 15 March 1982 amending the import 
arrangements for certain products originating in the USSR and Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 877/82 of 16 April 1982 suspending imports of all products originating in 
Argentina 
57 U Khaliq, Ethical Dimensions of the Foreign Policy of the European Union: A Legal Appraisal 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008) p. 187; E Herlin-.DUQHOO¶(8YDOXHVDQGWKHVKDSLQJ
RIWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOOHJDOFRQWH[W·LQ'.RFKHQRYDQG)$PWHQEULQNHGVThe European 
8QLRQ·V6KDSLQJRIWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/HJDO2UGHU (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 
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concluded via the familiar Community method in the domain of the Common 
Commercial Policy.58 This arrangement continued to provide the basis for the settlement 
at Maastricht by transferring the practice to a combination of measures: a CFSP 
LQVWUXPHQWZKLFK¶SDYHVWKHZD\·59 for a Regulation. A specific Treaty article was 
introduced which provides for the following:  
Where a decision, adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on European 
Union, provides for the interruption or reduction, in part or completely, of economic and financial 
relations with one or more third countries, the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a joint proposal 
from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission, 
shall adopt the necessary measures. It shall inform the European Parliament thereof.60 
 7KHUHIRUHD¶OLQN·EHWZHHQWKH¶SROLWLFDO·&)63XQGHU7LWOH9RIWKH7UHDW\RQ
(XURSHDQ8QLRQDQGWKH¶OHJDO·&RPPXQLW\RUGHUZDVFUHDWHGZKLFKODUJHO\UHPDLQV
intact to this day. It has been cited as DQH[DPSOHRIWKH7(8DFWLQJLQD¶IDUVLJKWHG·ZD\
in terms of coherence and FRQVLVWHQF\RIWKH8QLRQ·VDFWLRQ.61 The years following the 
end of the Cold War permitted the UNSC to impose sanctions more regularly. Though 
criticised for inaction in the face of the breakup of Yugoslavia, the EU began to enact 
restrictive measures independently of the UNSC as it began to try to capitalise on the 
Treaty innovations at Maastricht outlined in part 1.  
The 9/11 attacks in the United States in 2001 were the catalyst for both the 
UNSC and the EU to begin to impose restrictive measures against natural and legal 
persons. The extent to which these types of sanctions have been imposed has meant that 
WKH\KDYHQRWRQO\EHFRPHDNH\SDUWRIWKH(8·VSUDFWLFHRIVDQFWLRQVEXWthat they 
                                                 
58 Koutrakos, see note 48 above, p 496 
59 )+RIIPHLVWHU¶7KH&RQWULEXWLRQRI(83UDFWLFHWR,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ·LQ0&UHPRQD
Developments in EU External Relations Law (Oxford University Press, 2008) p 91 
60 Article 215 (1) TFEU 
61 6'XNH¶&RQVLVWHQF\&RKHUHQFHDQG(8([WHUQDO$FWLRQ·LQ3.RXWUDNRVHG
European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives (Edward Elgar, 2011) p 25 
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KDYHEHFRPHD¶FRUQHUVWRQH·RIWKH&)6362 Some of these have resulted in high-profile 
legal challenges, and have led the CJEU to striking down sanctions against targeted 
individuals.63 
As Koutrakos has noted, the very fact that a foreign policy measure is required as 
DQLQWHJUDOSDUWRIWKHSURFHVVRIWKHLPSRVLWLRQRIVDQFWLRQVGHPRQVWUDWHVWKH¶PDWXULW\·
of the foreign policy rules and practices of the Union.64 By linking the CFSP with the 
¶UHJXODU·QRQ-CFSP legal order of the Union ensures that the EU is employing its 
economic strength and, crucially, an aspect of its legal order where transfer of 
competences and pooling of sovereignty has occurred. Further support for this point is 
provided by the decision of the Court of Justice in Centro Com,65 in which the CJEU held 
that a Regulation implementing a UN embargo against Serbia and Montenegro had 
established a system of mutual confidence between Member States in the effective 
implementation of the restrictive measures.66 The Court further held that even where 
measures ¶have been adopted in the exercise of national competence in matters of 
foreign and security policy, they must respect the Community rules adopted under the 
common commercial policy·.67 
The result is therefore that even if the CFSP measure itself must necessarily be 
followed by a Regulation concluded via the Community Method (Article 215 TFEU 
                                                 
62 &(FNHV¶(85HVWULFWLYH0HDVXUHVDJDLQVW1DWXUDODQG/HJDO3HUVRQV)URP
&RXQWHUWHUURULVWR7KLUG&RXQWU\6DQFWLRQV·Common Market Law Review 869 
63 Most notably in the Kadi series of cases: European Commission v Yassin Abdullah Kadi 
(Kadi II), C-584, C-593 and C-595/10, EU:C:2013:518. This point is returned to in the 
following part. 
64 Koutrakos, see note 48 above, p 497 
65 The Queen, ex parte Centro-Com Srl v HM Treasury and Bank of England, C-124/95, 
EU:C:1997:8 
66 It should be noted that the Centro Com case pre-dated the current legal arrangements 
provided for in the Treaty, which were considered in the Kadi cases, but the point made 
here remains valid: Eeckhout, see note 46 above  
67 The Queen, ex parte Centro-Com Srl v HM Treasury and Bank of England, C-124/95, 
EU:C:1997:8 para 30 
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VWDWHVWKDWWKH&RXQFLO¶VKDOO·² QRW¶PD\·² adopt measures)68, the Member States are 
working according to legal logics. In particular for autonomous measures, the Member 
States are working in a foreign policy context which is going to yield enforceable legal 
results as part of a CFSP acquis.69 The structure of the discussions of whether to impose 
sanctions, and if so how, is essentially a legalised one.  
In 2003, the Council adopted Guidelines on the implementation and evaluation 
RI&)63VDQFWLRQVDQGHQWUXVWHGWKLVWDVNWRWKH¶)RUHLJQ5HODWLRQV&RXQFLOORUV:RUNLQJ
3DUW\·The mandate of the Working Party includes the development of best practices 
among Member States in implementation of restrictive measures, using national experts. 
,WKDVVLQFHUHJXODUO\LVVXHGDQH[WHQVLYH¶%HVW3UDFWLFHV3DSHU·WRWKH3HUPDnent 
Representatives Committee of the Council (COREPER) on the use of the different types 
of sanctions.70 Best practice, which involves multiple actors, non-binding guidelines and 
FRQWLQXRXVGLDORJXHEHWZHHQVWDNHKROGHUVFRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGDVDQH[DPSOH¶Qew 
JRYHUQDQFH·ZKLFKKDVEHFRPHSUHYDOHQWLQRWKHUDUHDVRI(XURSHDQLQWHJUDWLRQDQG
cooperation.71 For the purposes of the discussion here, the institutionalised use of best 
practices is further evidence of a sophisticated level of engagement between actors which 
goes far deeper than periodic meetings between foreign ministers in a formal Council 
VHWWLQJUHVWULFWHGWRGLVFXVVLRQRI¶KLJK·SROLWLFVRQO\ 
                                                 
68 B Van Vooren and RA Wessel EU External Relations Law (Cambridge University Press, 
2014) p 395 
69 5:HVVHO¶5HVLVWLQJ/HJDO)DFWV$UH&)631RUPVDV6RIWDVWKH\VHHP"·
European Foreign Affairs Review 123 
70 6HHIRUH[DPSOH&RXQFLORIWKH(8¶)RUHLJQ5HODWLRQV&RXQVHOORUV:RUNLQJ3DUW\
Update of the EU Best Practices for the effective implementation of restrictive measures·
(2015) 7383/1/15 REV 1 
71 ¶1HZJRYHUQDQFH·DQG¶QHZPRGHVRIJRYHUQDQFH·LVSDUWLFXOarly associated with areas 
RI(8DFWLYLW\ZKHUH¶KDUG·OHJLVODWLRQLVRIWHQHVFKHZHGLQIDYRXURIPRGHVZKLFKUHO\
on multi-level coordination, benchmarking and peer-review. It is particularly widespread 
LQDUHDVDVVRFLDWHGZLWK¶6RFLDO(XURSH·6HH-6FRWWDQG'07UXEHN¶0LQGWKH*DS/DZ
DQG1HZ$SSURDFKHVWR*RYHUQDQFHLQWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ·European Law 
Journal DQG.$$UPVWURQJ¶7KH&KDUDFWHURI(8/DZDQG*RYHUQDQFH)URP
¶&RPPXQLW\0HWKRG·WR1HZ0RGHVRI*RYHUQDQFH·Current Legal Problems 179 
 18 
Taken to its logical conclusion, the forum in which the Member States discuss 
sanctions and take measures is that same forum as which discusses non-sanctions CFSP 
matters too. For example, the Conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council of June 201572 
reveal that of the eleven items on the agenda, two were directly concerned with the 
continuation of EU sanctions regimes (against Syria and the Russian Federation) and a 
third indirectly (as part of possible future action to take against Burundi). Two other 
LWHPVZHUHFORVHO\UHODWHGWRWKH(8·Vuse of sanctions (discussion on future elections to 
be held in Myanmar, which is currently under an EU sanction regime) and as part of the 
discussions on EU-UN cooperation. 
With this in mind, it it less likely that the logics change when discussing matters, 
PDNLQJWKH¶SROLWLFDO·DQGWKH¶OHJDO·DQDUWLILFLDOGLVWLQFWLRQLQ terms of both substance 
and institutional competences. That is not to say that the same outcomes will always be 
reached for a foreign policy issue under discussion within the CFSP. Rather, a view that a 
¶SROLWLFDO·&)63RSHUDWHVLQLVRODWion from potentiaO¶OHJDO·RXWFRPHVEHFRPHV
increasingly hollow, and especially in the post-Lisbon era. $V:HVVHOH[SODLQV¶given the 
G\QDPLFVRIWKH/LVERQDSSURDFKWRFRQVROLGDWLQJWKH(8·V external relations, it will be 
increasingly difficult to deny a link with other policies, allowing the Court to take CFSP-
dimensions along in its assessment of those policies·73 
In short, sanctions are a key foreign policy tool at the disposal of the EU and 
underpinned by legal processes. The division between the CFSP as representing the 
¶FRUH·RIWKH(8·VIRUHLJQSROLF\DQGWKHUHVWRIWKH(8·VOHJDORUGHULVQRWLQGLFDWLYHRI
an absolute unwillingness to bestow on foreign policy the procedural qualities provided 
by law. Moreover, the iterative processes of legal challenges, redrafting and reissues of 
sanctions demonstrates that this is a highly-legalised domain.  
                                                 
72 &RXQFLORIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶2XWFRPH- 3400th &RXQFLO0HHWLQJ)RUHLJQ$IIDLUV·
(2015) 10185/15 
73 Ibid p 14 
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3. EXPLORING THE DEPTH AND BREADTH OF 
EU SANCTIONS  
Considering the legalisDWLRQRIWKH(8·VIRUHLJQSROLF\must inevitably go hand in hand 
with examining the context of the cases where sanctions have been used. One might say 
that this is a chicken and egg situation, i.e. did the legalisation occur as a result of the use 
of sanctions, or does the legalisation of the foreign policy facilitate the use of sanctions 
as a lynchpin of EU foreign policy? The argument here is that it is a two-way process: the 
nature of sanctions themselves as being more than a symbolic gesture necessitates a legal 
approach in working out the detail of the sanctions themselves, their likely effects on the 
third country/individual and the impact on and interface with other EU policies. 
Conversely, the increase since the Treaties of Maastricht and Lisbon in the instances of 
imposing sanctions DQGWKHLUYDULHW\LQVXEVWDQFHDQGGHSWKVKRZVWKDWWKH(8·V
extensive use of sanctions ² or even merely discussing whether they should be applied or 
not ² is evidence of a legalised foreign policy machinery capable of taking such decisions 
and applying them. This section explores the nature and diversity of the sanctions 
regimes currently in place to support this point. 
As of mid-2015, the EU operates 33 sanctions regimes. All but two of these 
regimes are in place towards third countries: 11 of the target countries are in sub-Saharan 
Africa,74 nine in the Middle East, North Africa and Gulf,75 three in Asia,76 six in Europe77 
and two in the Americas.78 Most of these are addressed to the government of the 
country, but they might also concern only part of a country which may not be under the 
effective control of the national government. Ukraine, for example, is listed as a 
                                                 
74 &HQWUDO$IULFDQ5HSXEOLF'HPRFUDWLF5HSXEOLFRI&RQJR&{WHG·,YRLUH(ULWUHD
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Republic of Guinea, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Zimbabwe 
75 Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen 
76 China, Myanmar, North Korea 
77 Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, Ukraine 
78 Haiti and the United States of America 
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sanctions regime but this only applies to areas in Eastern Ukraine which are not under 
the control of the national government, and to the government of the Russia Federation 
for its actions in Ukraine. A similar situation applies to Moldova, where sanctions apply 
only to the break-away Transnistria region.  The remaining two regimes apply to 
suspected natural or legal persons who are members or supporters of Al Qaida79 or other 
groups listed as supporting terrorism.80 They may also be addressed to a former 
government of the country and the individuals associated with it (such as the case for 
Tunisia)81. Most of the sanctions regimes, as well as the lists of individuals and entities 
are revisited and regularly updated: the Implementing Regulation for the original CFSP 
Common Position 2002/42 has been revised and updated 226 times as of March 2015.82  
 The use of sanctions is thus widespread in terms of geographical reach. This 
demonstrates on the one hand that the EU has used them in relations to foreign policy 
issues beyond its immediate borders, or only towards countries which have, for example, 
only a limited economic relationship with the Union. If the use of sanctions was limited 
only to the latter examples ² for example, small states in Africa ² it might be suggested 
that the EU was only prepared to use sanctions against countries where there was no 
economic or other impact on the EU and its interests. However, the list of target 
countries reveals that this is not the case: the EU has demonstrated a willingness to use 
sanctions as a foreign policy tool across the globe, and against both large and small states 
with varying degrees of economic and military power. The geographical aspect is also 
                                                 
79 Council Common Position (EU) 2002/402/CFSP [2002] OJ L139/4 concerning 
restrictive measures against Usama bin Laden, members of the Al-Qaida organisation 
and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with 
them 
80 Council Common Position (EU) 2001/931/CFSP [2001] OJ L344/93 on the 
application of specific measures to combat terrorism 
81 Council Decision (EU) 2011/72/CFSP [2011] OJ L28/62 concerning restrictive 
measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Tunisia 
82 Source: European External Action Service 
http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf (accessed 26 June 2015) 
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significant in considering a legalised foreign policy which does not merely rely on 
bilateral relations with states concerned. Rather, because of the multitude of complex 
frameworks which rely on multilateral and bilateral legal agreements based on a mix of 
CFSP and non-CFSP competences, including the EU-African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) group; the European Neighbourhood Policy and so on, any discussion of 
sanctions must necessarily pay attention to the effects on multilateral relationships which 
involve other states too. Hence, not only are different solutions likely for sanctions 
towards different states for political reasons, but potentially also for legal ones too. 
 The type of sanctions and their variety is revealing in terms of the huge diversity 
in the areas covered DQGWKHLUUDLVRQG·rWUH. Although there is no space here for a detailed 
examination of sanctions as they apply on a case-by-case basis,83 it is essential to note the 
scale of sanctions in place DQGWKHODFNRID¶RQHVL]HILWVDOO·DSSURDFK. For example, the 
sanctions placed on Iran for both its nuclear programme and human rights situation are 
extensive.84 They cover limitations on imports and exports of goods, the provisions of 
services, embargoes on dual-use goods and any arms of related material and travel bans 
on individual leaders. The sanctions on Iran regarding its nuclear programme were 
agreed in a UNSC resolution,85 but the EU has also added individuals to the sanctions list 
unilaterally.86 
                                                 
83 See, for a general overview, F Giumelli Coercing, constraining and Signalling: Explaining UN 
and EU Sanctions after the End of the Cold War (ECPR Press, 2011) and for case-studies on 
Iran, Russia and North Korea: PE Dupont ¶Countermeasures and Collective Security: 
7KH&DVHRIWKH(86DQFWLRQV$JDLQVW,UDQ· (2012) 17 (3) Journal of Conflict and Security 
Law 53DWWHUVRQ¶(86DQFWLRQVRQ,UDQWKH(XURSHDQ3ROLWLFDO&RQWH[W·
(1) Middle East Policy 135 
84 Council Decision (EU) 2010/413/CFSP [2010] OJ L195/39 concerning restrictive 
measures against Iran and repealing Common Position 2007/140/CFSP and Council 
Decision (EU) 2011/235/CFSP [2011] OJ L100/51 concerning restrictive measures 
directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Iran  
85 UNSC Resolution S/RES/1737 (2006) 
86 C Beaucillon ¶&RPPHQWFKRLVLUVHVPHDVXUHVUHVWULFWLYHV· EUISS Occasional 
Paper, No. 100 p 15 
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 More recently, the sanctions placed on the Russian Federation87 are also 
extensive but were not prompted by a UNSC Resolution. Placing extensive sanctions on 
Russia is significant for many reasons, including the impact on the extensive economic 
relations between the EU and Russia, the diplomatic relationships within other 
institutional frameworks (both EU and non-EU, such as NATO) and on 
bilateral/multilateral relations with other neighbouring countries.88  
Other sanctions regimes are much less extensive, and apply only to limited 
economic or military domains. At the other end of a scale, the sanctions applicable to the 
United States89 are very limited and relate only to the extraterritorial effects of domestic 
legislation which continues the embargo against Cuba. 
5HVWULFWLYHPHDVXUHVRQLQGLYLGXDOVDUHRIWHQNQRZQDV¶VPDUW· sanctions since 
measures taken against states in which they reside or operate would not be effective in 
meeting the aims of disrupting the activities of those suspected of terrorism, and are 
likely to cause humanitarian and wider economic problems. Although primarily 
associated with the period following 9/11, the first use of smart sanctions against 
individuals was by UNSC Resolution 1267 (1999). This resolution obliged states to freeze 
the financial assets owned or controlled by Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaida and the Taliban. 
UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001) was aimed at the prevention of terrorism more generally. 
The variety of sanctions applied in different situations supports the legalisation 
argument. In deciding whether to impose sanctions, what kind of sanctions and against 
whom, the actors must necessarily take into consideration the goals to be achieved as 
well as the previous sets of practices the EU has built up. This is more than simply 
                                                 
87 Council Decision (EU) 2014/512/CFSP [2014] OJ L229/13 concerning restrictive 
measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine  
88 This point is returned to in the following part. 
89 Council Joint Action (EU) 96/668/CFSP [1996] OJ L309/7 and Council Regulation 
(EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 protecting against the effects of the extra-
territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon 
or resulting therefrom OJ L309/1 
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paying regard to the political ramifications of sanctions (though this is of course 
important) because the EU must take into account what the legal effects of sanctions ² 
SDUWLFXODUO\WKHPRUHFUHDWLYHXVHRI¶VPDUW·VDQFWLRQV² would be. For instance, how can 
a travel ban on officials from a country under sanctions work in practice? Would the way 
in which it is put in place violate principles of international law? What should be the 
required amount of intelligence required for inclusion in a sanctions regime? All the 
questions can be answered by a build-up of rule-making through practice in the different 
situations. This also includes the case-law of the CJEU and General Court as the post-
Kadi90 due process requirements and confidential-information handling, including 
changes to its rules of procedure.91 The regularity of this practice and build up of rules 
and norms means that the decision-making process does not occur in a legal vacuum. 
Much of the focus has been on due process rights and the intensity of review of 
sanctions imposed upon individuals,92 particularly in the Kadi rulings. These sanctions 
regimes are a combination of UNSC-based ones and autonomous EU sanctions, 
including regional-based organisations considered to be involved in terrorism.93 Member 
State authorities are responsible for feeding this information up to the EU level.94 As 
                                                 
90 There is a wealth of academic commentary on the Kadi caselaw. For a detailed, multi-
angled analysis, see the contributions to M Avbelj, F Fontanelli and G Martinico (eds) 
Kadi on Trial: a Multifaceted Analysis of the Kadi Trial (Routledge, 2014) 
91 6HHWKHH[SODQDWRU\QRWHVSURYLGHGLQWKHIROORZLQJ&RXQFLORIWKH(8¶'UDIW5XOHVRI
Procedure of the General &RXUW·0DUFK 
92 For an overview, see C Eckes EU Counter-Terrorist Policies and Fundamental Rights: The 
Case of Individual Sanctions 2[IRUG8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV1/DYUDQRV¶-XGLFLDO5HYLHZ
of UN Sanctions by the European Court oI-XVWLFH·Nordic Journal of 
International Law 343; C Harlow and R Rawlings Process and Procedure in EU Administration 
(Hart Publishing, 2015) pp 312-321 
93 &(FNHV¶(8&RXQWHU-7HUURULVW6DQFWLRQVDJDLQVW,QGLYLGXDOV3UREOHPVDQG3HULOV·
(2012) 17 (1) European Foreign Affairs Review 113-132 
94 Common Position (EU) 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the application of 
specific measures to combat terrorism (2001) OJ L344/93. Article 1 (4) of the Common 
Position details the procedure for feeding LQIRUPDWLRQ¶The list in the Annex shall be 
drawn up on the basis of precise information or material in the relevant file which 
indicates that a decision has been taken by a competent authority in respect of the 
persons, groups and entities concerned «. Persons, groups and entities identified by the 
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such, the EU does not merely play a substitute role for what the Member States would be 
obliged to do individually according to the rules of international law. Instead, it has 
asserted its own autonomy in decision-making on the basis of information provided by at 
least one Member State.95 Since an EU measure would of course be effective across all 
the Member States, this practice necessarily indicates a level of trust that the information 
provided by the authorities in the Member States is accurate and that action is thus 
justified. 
The role of the Court of Justice and the protection of individual rights is 
necessary for the discussion here, since the opportunity for the Court to review CFSP 
measures adds to the increasingly dense legal landscape and thus ² as a necessary 
consideration ² IHHGVEDFNLQWRWKH&RXQFLO·VGHFLVLRQ-making processes. The Treaty 
provisions preclude procedural and substantive review of CFSP measures, via the judicial 
review process96 or from a preliminary reference from a national court,97 except for the 
legality of restrictive measures.98 Human rights challenges cannot engage the Court with 
regards to CFSP measures, even though EU foreign policy has already given rise to cases 
                                                                                                                                           
Security Council of the United Nations as being related to terrorism and against whom it 
has ordered sanctions may be included in the list. For the purposes of this paragraph 
"competent authority" shall mean a judicial authority, or, where judicial authorities have 
no competence in the area covered by this paragraph, an equivalent competent authority 
in that area.· 
95 17VDJRXULDV¶&RQFHSWXDOL]LQJWKH$XWRQRP\RIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ·LQ5&ROOLQV
and ND White International Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy (Routledge, 2011) pp 
348-349 
96 Article 263 TFEU 
97 Article 19 (3) (b) TFEU gives the authority to the Court of Justice to give prelimiary 
UXOLQJV¶on the interpretation of Union law or the validity of acts adopted by the 
LQVWLWXWLRQV·7KH$UWLFOHGRHVQRWPHQWLRQWKH&)63EXWVD\VLQ$UWLFOH´LQ
accordance with tKH7UHDWLHVµ6HHDOVR0%UNDQ¶The Role of the European Court of 
Justice in the Field of Common Foreign and Security Policy after the Treaty of Lisbon: 
1HZ&KDOOHQJHVIRUWKH)XWXUH· in PJ Cardwell (ed) EU External Relations Law and Policy in 
the Post-Lisbon Era (TMC Asser Press, 2012) p 100 
98 Article 215 (3) TFEU 
 25 
in the European Court of Human Rights99 and the Treaty foresees the eventual EU 
adhesion to the European Convention.100 Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the Union on the right to an effective remedy is difficult to square with the 
exclusion of the Court from CFSP matters, which could conceivably affect the legal 
rights of individual citizens.101  
Under Article 275 TFEU, the Court is permitted to review decisions affecting 
rights of natural/legal persons (brought under Article 263 TFEU) but only in cases where 
restrictive measures are placed upon them.102 The individual lists have been the subject of 
numerous challenges in the General Court and from this we can surmise, as Eeckhout 
has posited, that strict review is exercised.103 It is also worth noting Declaration 25 
attached to the Treaty on Articles 75 and 215 TFEU which underlines the importance of 
due process and WKH&RXUW·V legal oversight:104 
¶7KH&RQIHUHQFHUHFDOOVWKDWWKHUHVSHFWIRUIXQGDPHQWDOULJKWVDQGIUHHGRPVLPSOLHVLQ
particular, that proper attention is given to the protection and observance of the due process rights of the 
individuals or entities concerned. For this purpose and in order to guarantee a thorough judicial review of 
decisions subjecting an individual or entity to restrictive measures, such decisions must be based on clear 
and distinct criteria. These criteria should be tailored to the specifics of each restrictive measXUH· 
                                                 
99 M-G GarbagnaWL.HWYHO¶The Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in Respect 
of the ComPRQ)RUHLJQDQG6HFXULW\3ROLF\· (2006) 55 ICLQ 77 
100 6HHIXUWKHU&(FNHV¶EU Accession to the ECHR: Between Autonomy and 
$GDSWDWLRQµModern Law Review DQG7/RFN¶Accession of the EU to the 
(&+5·in D Ashiagbor, N Countouris and I Lianos (eds) The European Union after the 
Treaty of Lisbon (Cambridge University Press, 2012) p 109. 
101 %UNDQ¶The Role of the European Court of Justice, see note 97 above, p 106 
102 It is worth noting here that since this provision is new, it was not used in the Kadi and 
Al Barakaat cases (see note 63 above) which were brought on the basis of the 
implementation powers via a Regulation pursuant to a CFSP Common Position 
(formerly Article 60 and 301 EC, now found in Article 215 TFEU). 
103 Eeckhout, see note 46 above, p 546 
104 P Craig The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics and Treaty Reform (Oxford University Press, 2010) 
p 396 
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Attempts to enlarge the scope of human rights review of CFSP measures have not 
been fully successful. In its 2012 judgment in Parliament v Council, the Court rejected an 
argument by the European Parliament that it would be contrary to EU law to adopt 
measures having a direct impact on the fundamental rights of individuals and groups 
which excluded the participation of the Parliament.105 The Court stated that the Charter 
binds all institutions (and therefore also when institutions are acting under the CFSP) but 
did not elaborate on Article 47 specifically.106 However, in a further Parliament v Council107 
decision (which did not concern sanctions) the Court held that a minimum of democratic 
and judicial scrutiny applies to the CFSP.108 The result of the decision confirms the view 
that the CFSP is more integrated into the legal order of the EU than can be assumed 
from some of the Treaty provisions. The Court has a further opportunity to review the 
compatibility of CFSP measures and sanctions and judicial oversight in the pending 
Rosneft case.109 
The question of whether sanctions are effective in terms of achieving goals and 
outcomes is beyond the scope of the discussion here. Existing literature on this topic 
holds that sanctions can be an effective tool, but this is also context-specific. Whether 
effective or not ² or whether motivated by values or economic/security interests, the 
argument here is that the discussion and eventual decision to impose sanctions is 
VLJQLILFDQWLWPDUNVWKH(8RXWDVDQDFWRUFDSDEOHRI¶GRLQJ·WKLQJV$QGHYHQZKHUH
                                                 
105 Parliament v Council, see note Error! Bookmark not defined. above, para 83 
106 Ibid. paras 83-84. 
107 European Parliament v Council of the European Union (Mauritius Treaty), C-658/11, 
EU:C:2014:2025 
108 Ibid para 73 
109 Rosneft, C-72/15 (pending). The case, referred by the High Court of England and 
Wales to the CJEU via the preliminary reference procedure, concerns the sanctions 
DJDLQVWWKH5XVVLDQ)HGHUDWLRQDQGDVNVDVHULHVRITXHVWLRQVSHUWDLQLQJWRWKH&RXUW·V
right to review CFSP measures, including with reference to the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights Article 47.  
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sanctions are the result of a UNSC lead, the EU has demonstrated its willingness to go 
further in some cases.  
 But more than that, the extensiveness of the sanctions regimes demonstrates that 
the EU is able to meet some of its Treaty-based goals in the CFSP. It has been argued 
WKDWGHVSLWHWKH(8·VFODLPVWRSXUVXHDYDOXH-led foreign policy based on the contents of 
Article 21 (2) TEU, economic and security interests take precedence.110 Yet, economic 
and security interests are also part of the &)63JLYHQLWVYHU\ZLGHGHILQLWLRQ¶DOODUHDVRI
IRUHLJQSROLF\·DVSHU$UWLFOH7(8The frequent calls for sanctions to be 
imposed on a country by inter alia the European Parliament, for example on countries 
which have passed discriminatory legislation against minorities,111 are made in part 
because the EU has demonstrated its ability and willingness to do so. And again, this is 
because the underpinning of legal authority and the density of legal interactions on 
individual rights between the institutions over the sanctions regimes PDNHVWKH(8·V
foreign policy both legalisHGDQG¶UHDO· 
4. AN EU-/('¶(8523($1· FOREIGN POLICY 
 
This section takes the argument one step further and suggests that the development of 
use of sanctions by the EU has had a secondary effect, namely the opportunity for wider 
leadership in the European neighbourhood via the CFSP and its sanctions regimes. In 
practice, this development has opened up the possibility for 14 non-EU states in Europe 
to be offered the opportunity to align themselves with the restrictive measures regimes 
imposed by the EU on a case-by-case basis via a CFSP Declaration. In accepting the 
                                                 
110 .%UXPPHU¶,PSRVLQJ6DQFWLRQV7KH1RW6R´1RUPDWLYH3RZHU(XURSHµ·
(2) European Foreign Affairs Review 191 
111 European Parliament, Resolution 2014/2634(RSP) of 13 March 2014 on launching 
consultations to suspend Uganda and Nigeria from the Cotonou Agreement in view of 
recent legislation further criminalising homosexuality 
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offer by the Council to align with a Declaration, the scope of the restrictive measures is 
HIIHFWLYHO\HQODUJHGEH\RQGWKH(8·VERUGHUV. Although the non-EU states are not 
involved in the (legalised) processes of defining the scope and depth of sanctions, the 
domestic legal effect they give them contributes to a greater geographical reach of the 
CFSP. 
 The background context to this practice can be found in the enlargement 
process. During the preparations for the enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe and 
the Mediterranean in 2004, the candidate states underwent a process of adapting to all 
existing EU legislation and policies in force, including the CFSP. This was the first time 
that the enlargement process included the variety of types of sanctions detailed in the 
previous section. Since the sanctions regimes are put in place by a combination of a 
CFSP measure and a Regulation, these would form part of the acquis. But the innovation 
during the process was to invite the candidate states to publicly align themselves with the 
(8·s CFSP Declarations. CFSP Declarations have no binding force, but they have been 
the most visible instrument of the CFSP during its inception in the TEU (which has, of 
course, led to the familiar accusatiRQWKDWWKH&)63LV¶GHFODUDWRU\·DQGlittle more).112 
 Approximately three to five Declarations are issued each month. Most 
Declarations address pressing issues in international affairs, such as condemning an 
instance of death penalty use, aggressive behaviour by a state or human rights abuses. 
They were previously issued by the Council Presidency until the Treaty of Lisbon, which 
makes the High Representative responsible for their coordination, agreement and 
publication. There has been little academic attention paid to Declarations, especially from 
                                                 
112 T VonþLQD¶6SHDNLQJZLWK2QH9RLFH6WDWHPHQWVDQGDeclarations as an Instrument 
RIWKH(8·V&RPPRQ)RUHLJQDQG6HFXULW\3ROLF\·European Foreign Affairs 
Review 169 
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legal VFKRODUVWKRXJKWKH\GRUHYHDOWKH(8·VFROOHFWLYHYLHZVRQLVVXHVDQGKHQFHDOORZ
for an insight into the way in which we (should) view the EU as an international actor.113  
The various non-EU states are invited to align themselves with all Declarations 
issued by the High Representative, and the states are listed at the end of the Declaration 
text.114 The specific type of CFSP Declaration under examination here, however, is that 
which refers to the alignment of sanctions regimes by the third country and therefore does 
relate to the adoption of legal norms.  
The process is as follows: after every combination of CFSP Decision and 
subsequent Regulation creating or amending a sanctions regime, a CFSP Declaration is 
issued by the Council for the sole purpose of stating which of the 14 have aligned 
themselves and undertaken to make the domestic changes to their internal law and 
policies necessary to give legal effect to the sanctions. It is thus an example of legislative 
approximation, but ² uniquely ² one which is expressed through the CFSP. 
There is a clear rationale for this practice in the case of candidate states, since 
they will eventually be involved in the formation of the CFSP itself as full members. The 
extent to which they align themselves or not is commented upon in the periodic 
enlargement reports and in the case of repeated non-alignment may hamper the 
accession process.115 But what is interesting here is that this practice has been extended 
                                                 
113 6HHIRUH[DPSOH+6MXUVHQ¶:KDW.LQGRI3RZHU"·Journal of European 
Public Policy 169 
114 7KLVW\SLFDOO\WDNHVWKHIROORZLQJIRUP¶; have aligned themselves with this 
Declaration. They will ensure that their national policies conform to this Council 
Decision. The European Union takes note of this commitment and welcomes it.· 
115 For example, the October 2014 report on the former Yugoslav Republic of 
0DFHGRQLDQRWHV´7KHFRXQWU\·VDOLJQPHQWZLWK(8Declarations and Council decisions 
in the field of foreign and security policy deteriorated as compared with previous years 
and needs to EHLPSURYHGµ(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ¶3URJUHVV5HSRUWWKHIRUmer 
<XJRVODY5HSXEOLFRI0DFHGRQLD·$YDLODEOHDW
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-the-former-
yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia-progress-report_en.pdf (accessed 26 June 2015) p 59 
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WRVWDWHVDURXQGWKH(8·VERUGHUVZKRKDYHQRLPPHGLDWHRSSRUWXQLW\WRDSSO\WRMRLQ
the EU as full members, or who have chosen not to seek membership. 
The rationale for this practice is strongly related to the 2004 and 2007 
enlargements, which pushed the frontiers of the EU eastwards WRZDUGV¶QHZQHLJKERXUV· 
In 2004, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was launched. This was not solely 
D&)63LQVWUXPHQWEXWUDWKHU¶FURVVSLOODU·7KHPain aim was to foster closer relations 
DQG¶VKDUHYDOXHV·with all the states bordering, or close to, the EU and was initially 
NQRZQDV¶ZLGHU(XURSH·ZLWKDIRFXVILUPO\RQWKH(DVW. 7KHDLPRI¶EXLOGLQJVHcurity 
LQRXUQHLJKERXUKRRG·KDG already been articulated in the European Security Strategy 
(2003).116 The ENP was officially separate to the Euro-Mediterranean Process (the 
Barcelona Process) for states in the Middle East and North Africa, though was closely 
linked.117 The latter were brought into ENP due to the insistence of some EU Member 
States (especially France and Spain) who worried that the EU might focus too heavily on 
the East to the detriment of the South. The Treaty of Lisbon introduced an express 
SURYLVLRQWKDWWREXLOG¶VSHFLDO·UHODWLRQVKLSVZith neighbouring countries based on the 
values of the Union.118 
 $VSDUWRIWKH(8·VPLVVLRQWR¶VKDUHYDOXHV·ZLWKQHZQHLJKERXUVLQWKH(DVW
the EU has since 2007 invited most ENP states in Europe (Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
                                                 
116 &RXQFLORIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶(XURSHDQ6HFXULW\6WUDWHJ\$6HFXUH(XURSHLQD
%HWWHU:RUOG·003) 12 December 2003. Available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (accessed 26 June 
2015) 
117 3-&DUGZHOO¶(XUR0HG(XURSHDQ1HLJKERXUKRRG3ROLF\DQGWKH8nion for the 
0HGLWHUUHDQ2YHUODSSLQJ3ROLF\)UDPHVLQWKH(8·V*RYHUQDQFHRIWKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQ·
(2011) 49 (2) 219 
118 $UWLFOH7(8¶The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring 
countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded 
on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on 
FRRSHUDWLRQ· 
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Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine)119 to align themselves with CFSP Declarations. Although 
extending the invitation to other neighbourhood partners in the Mediterranean region, 
including Morocco and Jordan, has been mooted, it has not occurred.120 In addition to 
the states engaged in the enlargement process (Croatia,121 former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM), Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey), the invitation has also been 
extended to European Economic Area (EEA) members Iceland (which subsequently 
became part of the enlargement process), Norway and Liechtenstein, and the remaining 
states involved in the Western Balkans DV¶SRWHQWLDOEU membership cDQGLGDWHV·$OEDQLD
and Bosnia and Herzegovina).122 This brings to total number of invitees during the 
period under examination of 2007 to 2014 to a maximum of 15.123 The third states do 
not have any formal input into the text of the Declaration: the text is transmitted to them 
and the Declaration is issued several days later with their alignment listed if they have 
decided to take up the opportunity to do so,WLVWKXVD¶WDNHLWRUOHDYHLW·DSSURDFK
though the EU may wish to consider the rate of alignment should a state move closer to 
starting the enlargement process or seek deeper relations with the EU under ENP. 
 This evidence demonstrates that this practice can be seen as a success. From 
2007 until 2014, 556 Declarations were transmitted to the third states (these include 
                                                 
119 Belarus is technically covered by the ENP but has no substantial bilateral relationship 
with the EU, though the latter is using a variety of means to improve the democratic 
VLWXDWLRQLQWKHFRXQWU\6HHIXUWKHU(.RURVWHOHYD¶7KH(XURSHDQ8QLRQDQG%HODUXV
'HPRFUDF\3URPRWLRQE\7HFKQRFUDWLF0HDQV"·Democratization DOI: 
10.1080/13510347.2015.1005009 
120 Council of the (XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶&RQFOXVLRQRIWKHth &RXQFLO0HHWLQJ·
10657/07, 18 June 2007. The text of the conclusions states that a ¶similar possibility 
should be pursued for the EU's Mediterranean partners·. 
121 Croatia was a candidate state from 2004 and aQ¶DFFHVVLRQVWDWH·IURP'HFHPEHU
until its full EU membership in July 2013. 
122 Kosovo is regarded a potential candidate for EU membership, but its statehood is not 
currently recognised by several Member States and has not been invited to align. See 
fuUWKHU6.HXNHOHLUH$.DODMDDQG$dROODNX¶7KH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ·V3ROLF\RQ.RVRYR·
in P Koutrakos European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives (Edward Elgar 2011).  
123 The period under examination begins in January 2007. The invitation to align was 
extended to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in July 2007. Since Croatian assession to 
the EU, the total number of partner states is 14. 
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general Declarations and the specific Declarations relating to sanctions). The rates of 
alignment for seven states was over 90% (Croatia, Montenegro, Iceland, Albania, 
Liechtenstein, Norway and Moldova); over 70% for Turkey, FYROM, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Serbia and Ukraine; 62% for Armenia, 58% for Georgia and 20% for 
Azerbaijan.  
Of the total number of 556 Declarations, 149 are of particular interest here as these 
Declarations give specific notice of the alignment of the third states with a CFSP 
Decision (or, pre-Lisbon, a Common Position) on the imposition of restrictive measures 
against a state, a breakaway region of a state or individuals through the two counter-
terrorism regimes. The number of Declarations to this effect as a percentage of the total 
(27%) underlines the importance of sanctions as a foreign policy tool and part of the 
CFSP. The third states undertake to align their legal systems to enable the freezing of 
assets, limitation of trade or impose travel bans on officials. Although the EU has no 
mechanism to assess whether the restrictive measures are in fact respected within the 
country, it has commented (as part of the enlargement process) on states which do not 
yet have the necessary tracing procedures at a domestic level in place.124 
 The rates of alignment vary considerably and the rates of alignment are, in 
general, lower that the rates identified above for general Declarations which do not 
require any domestic legal changes. Croatia, before it became a Member State in July 
2013, aligned itself with all restrictive measures. This would be expected of a state which 
is close to completing the accession process, though future enlargement itself does not 
                                                 
124 For example, as in the case of Serbia, where the Commission commented in 2014 that, 
´A law that would establish a system for tracking the implementation of restrictive 
measXUHVVWLOOQHHGVWREHDGRSWHGµ(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ¶3URJUHVV5HSRUW6HUELD·
(2014) http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20140108-serbia-
progress-report_en.pdf (accessed 26 June 2015) p 62 
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always explain a higher or lower rate of alignment.125 FYROM, Montenegro, Albania and 
Liechtenstein aligned themselves with over 90% of restrictive measures; Iceland and 
Norway over 80%; Serbia and Moldova over 70% and Turkey, Armenia, Georgia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina between 40% and 50%. Azerbaijan only aligned itself with 
approximately 5% of sanctions, which generally occurred during a short period of several 
months in 2013. Nevertheless, the extent to which third states have committed 
themselves to adopting instances of EU law on sanctions into their domestic legal 
systems is impressive and effectively widens to the scope and impact of a measure. 
This practice has been particularly effective with the two sanctions regimes on 
individuals and the measures taken against countries in Africa (sXFKDV&{WHG·,YRLUHDQG
Guinea),126 Syria127 and Burma/Myanmar.128 It has been markedly less successful with the 
measures taken against the Russian Federation following its annexation of Crimea, where 
the states aligning have often not included (for example) Serbia, Moldova and states in 
the Caucasus, even if the states supported UN General Assembly resolutions recalling 
8NUDLQH·VWHUULWRULDOLQWHJULW\129 The dRPLQDQFHRIWKHLVVXHRI5XVVLD·VDFWLRQs within the 
CFSP in 2014 and a clear nervousness amongst neighbourhood states in aligning 
                                                 
125 For example, Turkey is part of the enlargement process but has a lower overall rate of 
alignment than some other states which are not (yet) in this position. 
126 See, for example: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European 
Union on the alignment of certain third countries with the Council Decision 
2011/412/CFSP amending Decision 2010/656/CFSP renewing the restrictive measures 
against Côte d'Ivoire; Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union 
on the alignment of certain third countries concerning restrictive EU measures against 
the Republic of Guinea (Common Position 2009/788/CFSP) 
127 Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the 
alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision 2014/74/CFSP amending 
Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria 
128 Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the 
alignment of certain third countries with the Council Decision 2011/239/CFSP 
amending Decision 2010/232/CFSP renewing restrictive measures against 
Burma/Myanmar 
129 See, for example, (XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ¶Progress Report: the former Yugoslav 
5HSXEOLFRI0DFHGRQLD·
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-the-former-
yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia-progress-report_en.pdf (accessed 26 June 2015) p 59 
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themselves with restrictive measures against Russia means that the overall level of 
alignment has dropped towards the end of the period under examination. The same 
rationale applies for some states nervous about contradicting Russian policies which have 
differed sharply from those of the EU, such as those towards Libya.130 This demonstrates 
that the adoption of Declarations rests on a political evaluation of the consequences of 
aligning itself firmly with the EU as well as the legalised process of giving effect to the 
sanctions. Nevertheless, if sanctions related to Russia are removed from the equation 
then the overall level of alignment with EU restrictive measures ² both autonomous and 
emerging from the UNSC ² increases for most states.  
 Thus, the EU can be seen to have succeeded in integrating the non-EU 
states in its neighbourhood into its sanctions regimes. The above analysis demonstrates 
that in many cases, adoption of sanctions has become more than a political decision but 
a legalised one too: the non-(8VWDWHVKDELWXDOO\UHVSRQGSRVLWLYHO\WRWKH(8·V
invitations and incorporate the sanctions into their domestic legal orders. This matters 
for the narrative in this article, since a high level of alignment with a CFSP sanctions 
regime puts the EU in the role of a leader of a European, as opposed to only an EU, 
foreign policy. A Declaration issued in the name of the EU and its Member States with 
14 additional states LQDGGLWLRQWRWKH(8·Vbrings the total to 42 states. This is over a 
fifth of the total number of states in the United Nations (193) and can be presented 
beyond Europe as a truly continent-wide view. A high degree of alignment is potentially 
very useful if the EU hopes to spearhead efforts for a new international agreement, 
where a head-count of states (despite their size) is crucial.  
 For restrictive measures, the alignment by third countries significantly 
increases the practical reach of the CFSP, assuming of course that states who align 
                                                 
130 1*KD]DU\DQDQG$+DNRE\DQ¶/HJLVODWLYHDSSUR[LPDWLRQDQGDSSOLFDWLRQRI(8ODZ
LQ$UPHQLD·LQ39DQ(OVXZHJHDQG53HWURYLegislative Approximation and Application of 
EU Law in the Eastern Neighbourhood of the European Union (Routledge, 2014) p 213 
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themselves are taking the necessary steps to ensure that restrictive measures are enforced 
within their territories. Enlarging the geographical scope of restrictive measures brings 
WRJHWKHUWKH(8·VHFRQRPLFZHLJKWZLWKSRWHQWLDOVWURQJIRUHLJQSROLF\LQIOXHQFHRYHU
the targeted third states or individuals. An expanded reach of EU sanctions is likely to 
disrupt the movement of financial assets from state-to-state. 7KHWUHQGIRU¶VPDUW·
sanctions which aim to restrict financial transactions by freezing assets etc can be more 
effective through alignment even with (very) small states such as Liechtenstein, since the 
presence of significant financial institutions in the partner state and their importance is 
not linked to the size of a territory or, for example, military strength. Alignment by third 
states with restrictive measures via public CFSP Declarations is proof that the Union has 
WKHFDSDFLW\WRSXWLQSODFH¶SUDFWLFDO·PHDVXUHVgrounded in law as well as words which 
have a strong potential to meet the goals of the sanctions, and hence the CFSP itself. The 
practice of alignment therefore underlines the significance of the CFSP as a legalised EU 
foreign policy. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has attempted to demonstrate that the foreign policy of the EU as 
encapsulated by the Common Foreign and Security Policy is far from a domain in which 
WKHUHLVQR¶ODZ·5DWKHUWKURXJKDSURFHVVRIOHJDOLVDWLRQWKH¶RWKHUQHVV·RIWKH&)63LV
less profound than is often assumed. With the increase in the imposition of traditional 
and ¶VPDUW·VDQFWLRQVYLDDXWRQRPRXVPHDVXUHVDQGFRXQWHU-terrorism listings, the EU 
has ¶ODUJHO\RFFXSLHGWKHILHOG·131 of activity vis-à-vis the Member States, and of the CFSP 
itself. This is a remarkable state of affairs when one considers that neither sanctions nor 
WKH&)63ZHUHDVVXPHGWREHDQ\ZKHUHFORVHWRWKHFRUHRIWKH(8·VH[WHUQDODFWLYLW\DW
the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Maastricht.  
                                                 
131 Eeckhout, see note 46 above, p 546 
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The developments since the Treaty of Lisbon in terms of using sanctions as a 
cornerstone of foreign policy, and in particular towards Russia, demonstrates that the EU 
has succeeded in tying together its economic weight with its search for an international 
role. As part of the CFSP, the increasingly sophisticated use of sanctions and their 
application to situations around the globe is evidence of a symbiotic relationship: 
sanctions sustain and provide a backbone to the CFSP whilst the legalised underpinnings 
of the CFSP provide the institutional context in which sanctions can be discussed and 
agreed. In turn, this creates the expectation that sanctions ² and thus foreign policy ² 
represent something the EU can do which has practical effects in fostering change. 
 $VDFRQVHTXHQFHWKH&)63VKRXOGEHXQGHUVWRRGOHVVDVWKH¶RWKHU·DQGPRUH
WKH¶QRUPDO·ZLWKLQWKH(8·VLQVWLWXWLRQDODUUDQJHPHQWVDQGHYHQLWVOHJDORUGHU
Furthermore, the CFSP merits continued scholarship and attention from lawyers in 
terms of how the legal norms are created: this is particularly the case given the success 
WKH(8KDVH[SHULHQFHGLQ¶H[SRUWLQJ·WKH&)63WRQHLJKERXULQJFRXQWULHVDQGIRUJLQJ
what should be seen as a genuine Europe-wide sanctions regime and, hence, foreign 
policy.   
